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Quota Systems for Disabled 




the integration of disabled people in the labour market represents one 
of the biggest challenges for social and labour market policies. health- 
impaired persons face a range of employment barriers, not least because 
recent changes in technology and globalisation trends have led to a shift 
towards highly-skilled jobs. thus, there is a reduced demand for less quali-
fied types of labour, in which disabled persons are over-represented. In 
addition, the recent economic crisis hit disadvantaged people hard and 
increased their inactivity- and unemployment rates.
the non-integration of disabled people in the labour market causes 
both costs for the economy and social disadvantages for the persons 
concerned. it reduces effective labour supply while at the same time 
increased expenditure for social transfers represents a burden for public 
finances. In 2009 incapacity-related spending amounted to 2.4% of GDP 
in the OECD countries on average (OECD Social Expenditure Data-
base). Due to demographic changes and a stagnating labour force in most 
European countries in the coming years, strategies for improvement gain 
in importance. persons with health impairments must be mobilised for la-
bour supply, also to secure economic growth. from the individual point of 
view, employment is a central factor for the social status and the personal 
identity of persons in working age. for the guarantee of equal opportuni-
ties and full participation in economic, cultural and social life, employment 
is of crucial importance. however, disability expenditure is still distorted 
toward passive transfers. In OECD-countries at most 5% of the total 
budget is spent on occupational and rehabilitation programmes (BMASK 
2012, 123f; OECD 2010).
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on average, in working age women are confronted with disability more 
frequently than men. Disabled persons feature a higher age and a lower 
educational level than non-disabled persons. Disabled persons are em-
ployed to a lesser extent (around 30-40% less) and are unemployed twice 
as often. When employed, disabled people are more often in jobs which 
require low qualifications. they face worse career perspectives and are 
more often in part-time work than their non-disabled colleagues. Due 
to lower employment rates and a higher dependency on social transfers, 
persons with disabilities are more often at risk of poverty (Brennan/Con-
roy 2009, 12; Eu-SIlC 2009; Greve 2009, 15; OECD 2010, 10). 
from differences in employment rates, no clear recommendations for 
policy measures for disabled people can be derived empirically. higher 
employment rates can be found in countries with employment quotas, 
other employer obligations and incentives, with widespread subsidised 
employment, etc., but also in countries where none of these measures 
are implemented. the limited empirical evidence suggests that most 
measures serve to secure working places of already employed persons, 
but contribute little to new occupations of disabled persons (OECD 
2010, 50/135).
this policy Brief looks at parameters, aspects and effectivity of quota 
systems in more detail. it will be followed by a policy Brief on other in-
tegration measures for disabled persons. Both policy Briefs are based on 
the project “measures for the labour market integration of persons with 
Disabilities” funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry for labour, Social 
affairs and Consumer protection.
2 Basic parameters and  
 registration process
Quota systems for private and/or public enterprises or institutions can 
be found in the majority of Eu countries (the exceptions are DK, EE, 
FI, lV, nl, SE and uK). their basic target is to stimulate labour demand 
by committing employers to employ a certain share of employees with 
disabilities. typically, the stipulated share ranges between 2% (ES) and 7% 
(It) of the workforce. Generally, quotas are only valid above a certain 
manpower threshold, which ranges between 15 (It) and 50 employees 
(ES, El, lt) (Applica/Cesep/European Centre 2007, 75ff; DeVos 2007, 48; 
OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 193; OECD 2010, 96). Alternatively, 
in some of the existing systems it is possible to conclude sub-contracts 
with organisations which feature a significant share of employees with 
disabilities, etc. (e.g. CZ, DE, ES, FR, SK) (OECD 2010, 79).
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in case the commitments are not met by the employers, usually they have 
to pay a fee to special funds (At, CZ, DE, El, ES, FR, Hu, It, lt, lu, Pl, 
SK, SI). those funds distribute the resources to employees with disabili-
ties, providers of special activities and employers with disabled employ-
ees (OECD 2010, 96). the spectrum of sanctions ranges from almost 
completely lacking fines in Spain, via small sanctions in most countries 
(additional payroll tax of approximately 0.5%, e.g. At, DE) to relatively 
high sanctions (1 to 4% of the payroll, FR, It, Pl). In principle, the lack of 
sanctions or enforcement instruments represents a problem of quota 
systems. in some countries there is also a bonus for companies which 
employ more than the required number of disabled persons (e.g. CZ, 
ES, Pl, SI) (OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 198; update European 
Centre).
almost all countries with quota systems have implemented measures for 
the registration of disabled persons at public institutions. they should 
determine the entitlement to working places reserved for disabled per-
sons. for the quota only those persons registered as disabled count who 
fulfil the stipulated criteria (OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 193/231; 
nDA 2007, 2). the legally registered status defines disability rather in a 
narrow way. thus, for persons with less disabilities or health constraints 
quota systems are not relevant. However, a broad definition would not 
provide an adequate foundation, as quota systems have to be selective 
(Knöpfel 2011; nDA 2007, 2; OECD 2010, 143).
3 Quota systems and anti- 
 discrimination legislation
Basically, quota systems and anti-discrimination legislation are contrary 
approaches for the labour market integration of disabled persons (Eich-
horst et al. 2010, 37; Greve 2009, 14). By trend, quota systems stress the 
concept of “limitation of abilities” and rely less on the concept of “capa-
bility”. they implicitly act on the assumption that disabled people are un-
able to compete for an occupation on the open labour market. a certain 
share of working places has to be reserved. thus, quotas coincide only to 
a limited extent with the principle of equal access and equal chances for 
all or with the social model of disability.
Accordingly, the required registration and classification processes have 
been criticised as potentially representing a discriminating treatment 
themselves (Brennan/Conroy 2009, 3; Europäische Kommission 2002, 
59ff; OECD 2010, 196). However, some of these social acts and problems 
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are also part of anti-discrimination approaches (Brennan/Conroy 2009, 5; 
Knöpfel 2011, 8; nDA 2007, 17). Furthermore, an exclusive anti-discrim-
ination approach could be insufficiently directed towards clearly defined 
policy targets (ORC 2011).
the Eu-Directive 2000/78/EG should guarantee equal treatment of all 
persons on the labour market and prevent discrimination inter alia re-
lated to disability (BMASK 2012, 123). the directive is inspired by a “civil 
rights”-approach and guarantees persons with disabilities individual rights 
for equal treatment with persons without disabilities. it considers reason-
able workplace adaptations which do not represent an undue burden 
for employers (Brennan/Conroy 2009, 1). the directive also indicates 
that more far-reaching measures related to disability are permitted. thus, 
it grants the option to member states to continue with quota systems 
along the required anti-discrimination legislation. also, disabilities are 
more or less the only reason for which member states have implemented 
quota systems or similar measures (Brennan/Conroy 2009, 12; Eichhorst 
et al. 2010, 39).
in fact, in most Eu countries the directive co-exists with other approach-
es which are embedded in employment and welfare measures already 
existing before, among them quota systems in 20 of 27 countries. thus, 
the majority of Eu countries has implemented approaches to prevent 
discrimination in addition to quota systems. However, the united King-
dom represents an exception, as it abolished its quota policies with the 
implementation of anti-discrimination legislation related to disability in 
the 1990s (even before the Eu-Directive came into place) (Brennan/ 
Conroy 2009,2).
4 Perspective of employers  
 and institutions
in many European countries the extent of incentives provided by quota 
systems is rather low. many employers consider sanctions to be minor 
additional nonwage labour costs and partly as fundraising by the gov-
ernment (OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 231; OECD 2009, 25). 
according to company polls, the exclusive costs related to fees are not 
central for the decision pro or contra the employment of disabled per-
sons. Costs due to modification measures, working place adaptations or 
other special arrangements are by far more significant (Diery et al. 1997; 
Fietz et al. 2011, 68).
By many employers sanc-
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For employers, independently from the fulfilment of the quota, an eco-
nomically profitable use of disabled persons as central decisive factor for 
an employment implies service capability and adequate qualification. Here, 
also potential supportive measures by public institutions play an impor-
tant role. as a rule, the perception of cooperative collaboration with 
supporting institutions is a pre-condition for the success of the integra-
tion of disabled persons (Fietz et al. 2011, 68ff). Basically, for governments 
employment quotas represent relatively low priced programmes, which 
are easily to finance. the employment of disabled persons is either sup-
ported by the fulfilment of the quotas or by employment programmes 
financed by the fees (Doose 2003, 8; OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 
231; sywottek 2011, 24).
5 General evidence of quota systems
obligatory employment quotas are generally better enforced than 
anti-discrimination legislation (OECD 2010, 135). In most countries the 
degree of fulfilment ranges between 30% and 70%. Countries with a rela-
tively high fulfilment around 60% are for example Austria, Germany and 
France (OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 193; OECD 2010, 143). the 
employment effectivity of quota systems has been little analysed. in addi-
tion, in available evaluations as a rule the environment of social insurance 
and employment policies remains unconsidered. By no means the rela-
tive effects of employment quotas can be compared with those of other 
measures for the labour market integration of disabled persons (lalive et 
al. 2009, 24; OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 227). In a cross-country 
perspective higher employment rates of persons with disabilities are not 
systematically correlated with employment quotas (neither positive nor 
negative) (OECD 2010, 50). It can be assumed that quotas (as employ-
ment subsidies in general) cause windfall gains, squeeze out- and substitu-
tional effects.
according to available empirical data quota systems only lead to small net 
employment gains and at times can only be justified for equity reasons. 
however, in the case of disabled persons this argument seems to be of 
special importance (OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 227f). Quota 
jobs tend to comprise low-qualified activities (Brennan/Conroy 2009, 3; 
Eichhorst et al. 2010, 8). Already employed persons who become disa-
bled and can be included, are more likely to be employed continuously, 
while quota systems provide only small incentives to hire disabled people. 
however, this is also the case with measures directly targeted at employ-
ers (Greve 2009, 14; OECD/Europäisches Zentrum 2003, 195; OECD 
2010, 135).
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another differentiated judgement of employment quotas arises in light 
of demographic change. the workforce is ageing and this increases the 
number of (already employed) disabled employees, leading companies to 
fulfil employment quota without any effort on their part. In case support 
is offered for employed disabled persons via the collected fees in addi-
tion, windfall gains are caused, if these persons would not be dismissed 
anyway (OECD 2010, 135; Sywottek 2011, 23f). this points to the “inher-
ent ambivalence of the quota system” (Deutscher Bundestag 2008, 12). If 
employees increasingly reach the disability status due to their age, em-
ployers have to pay fewer fees. as a consequence less money is available 
for the creation of new jobs for disabled people, while expenditures for 
permanent wage subsidies increase (Sywottek 2011, 25).
6 Conclusions
the integration of disabled people in the labour market represents one 
of the biggest challenges for both social and labour market policies. from 
differences in employment rates, no clear recommendations for certain 
measures for disabled people can be derived empirically. higher employ-
ment rates can be found in countries with employment quotas, other 
employer obligations and incentives, with widespread subsidised employ-
ment, etc., but also in countries where none of these measures are im-
plemented. according to available empirical data, quota systems only lead 
to small net employment gains. already employed persons who become 
disabled and can be included are more likely to be employed continu-
ously, while quota systems provide only small incentives to hire disabled 
people. however, this is also the case with measures directly targeted at 
employers.
in many European countries the extent of incentives provided by quota 
systems is rather low. many employers consider sanctions only as minor 
additional nonwage labour costs and the exclusive costs related to fees 
are not central in hiring decisions of disabled persons. for governments 
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are easily to finance. the employment of disabled persons is either sup-
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as a reaction to this development, concepts related to age-adequate 
staff development, work organisation and workplace arrangement, which 
are introduced in the framework of coping with demographic change, 
could be coordinated with integration measures for disabled persons 
in the labour market (Fietz et al. 2011, 67). According to a proposal by 
the OECD (2007, 163), the stipulated percentage of the quota could be 
adjusted to the prevalence of a certain degree of disability in the working 
age population (e.g. share of heavily disabled persons in each country). In 
addition, further efforts have to be undertaken to increase the share of 
disabled persons in the public sector, which is seen as innovative related 
to integration in most countries (OECD 2006, 159).
in principle, for the successful labour market integration of disabled per-
sons, strategies have to be developed which enable a better coordination 
between the behaviour of employers, employees, involved institutions and 
political targets. For all stakeholders (disabled persons, employers, institu-
tions and service providers) more incentives and support have to be 
created to keep disabled persons in employment, to enable new employ-
ment and to increase the employment efforts. this has to be combined 
with intensified employment expectations both on the side of employees 
with health problems and of the persons who support them and must 
be linked with mutual responsibilities. as such measures are not always 
popular, the responsibility has to be shared between governments, social 
partners, employers, employees and civil society (OECD 2010, 12/19).
Governments must provide a balanced setting of sanctions, incentives 
and support, which complement each other. to prevent possible negative 
outcomes for the labour market and the social security system, a coordi-
nated package of employment and other measures is required. for exam-
ple, the insider/outsider-problem of the labour market regulation has to 
be mentioned. increased obligations for employers could be a barrier for 
the employment of new employees. in this case additional mechanisms 
for the stimulation of labour demand (e.g. support for the adaptation of 
workplaces and working conditions) could be introduced (OECD 2010, 
17).
Further reading
Fuchs M. (2013), Beschäftigungsquoten für behinderte Personen: Para-
meter, Aspekte, Effektivität, in: Soziale Sicherheit 9/2013, 438-445.
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